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Abstract
The attribute framing effect, where people judge a quantity of an item more posi-
tively with a positively described attribute (e.g., “75% lean”) than its negative, albeit
normatively equivalent description (e.g., “25% fat”), is a robust phenomenon, which
may be moderated under certain conditions. In this paper, we investigated the mod-
erating effect of the characteristics of the quantifier term: its format (verbal,
e.g., “high,” or numerical, e.g., “75%”) and magnitude (i.e., if it is a small or large
quantity) using positive or negative synonyms of attributes (e.g., energy vs. calories).
Over five pre-registered studies using a 2 (synonym, between-subjects: positive or
negative)  2 (quantifier format, between-subjects: verbal or numerical)  2 (quanti-
fier magnitude, within-subjects: small or large) mixed design, we manipulated quanti-
fier format and magnitude orthogonally for synonyms with differing valence. We
also tested two mechanisms for the framing effect: whether the effect was medi-
ated by the affect associated with the frame and whether participants inferred the
speaker to be positive about the target. We found a framing effect with synonyms
that was reversed in direction for the small (vs. large) quantifiers, but not signifi-
cantly moderated by quantifier format. Both the affect associated with the frame
and the inferred level of speaker positivity partially mediated the framing effect, and
the level of mediation varied with quantifier magnitude. These results suggest that
the magnitude of the quantifier modifies one's evaluation of the frame, and the
mechanism for people's evaluations in a framing situation may differ for small and
large quantifiers.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
The attribute framing effect has been a widely studied psychological
bias in decision-making since early research demonstrated that people
prefer 75% lean meat to its complementary 25% fat (Levin, 1987).
Extensive research has documented the existence of this framing
effect in many important domains (e.g., health care: Gamliel &
Peer, 2010; medical risks: Peng et al., 2013; Welkenhuysen
et al., 2001; business performance: Janiszewski et al., 2003; Kuvaas &
Selart, 2004; sporting performance: Leong et al., 2017; enjoyment of
events: Isaac & Poor, 2016; and even mate choice: Saad & Gill, 2014).
The effect is generally replicable (with an average effect size of
d = 0.4 according to meta-analyses of the effect: Piñon &
Gambara, 2005; Steiger & Kühberger, 2018). Some conditions have
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been identified that magnify or reduce the effect, which are of
research interest because they help understand why framing effects
occur (Gal & Rucker, 2018).
In a typical attribute framing study, participants judge items with
an attribute described with one of two complementary phrases, either
positive or negative (Levin et al., 1998). The frames are traditionally
constructed using complementary proportions of antonyms (e.g., 25%
fat vs. 75% lean) so that the attribute quantity is the same in each
frame, making them logically equivalent. The positive frame is consis-
tently evaluated more favorably than its complementary negative
equivalent (Donovan & Jalleh, 1999; Kim et al., 2014; Levin &
Gaeth, 1988; Seta et al., 2010). Researchers have concluded that the
attribute's valence (e.g., fat vs. lean) affects people's judgements and
proposed explanations for this effect. The affective encoding account
posits that the positively valenced “lean” creates positive affect that
leads people to judge the product more favorably compared with the
negative affect created by “fat” (Levin & Gaeth, 1988). Alternatively,
the pragmatic inference account posits that speakers choose a positive
or negative term to convey some implicit information (Sher &
McKenzie, 2008). People could infer that there is more of the attri-
bute than a reference point (McKenzie & Nelson, 2003). Listeners can
also infer a speaker's viewpoint: for example, the speaker is more pos-
itive about the 75% lean meat as opposed to the 25% fat meat
(Hilton, 2008; Keren, 2007).
The different explanations of the framing effect have found inde-
pendent empirical support (e.g., Gamliel & Kreiner, 2019; Sher &
McKenzie, 2006). These explanations focus on how information about
the attribute's valence is encoded or interpreted. More recently,
researchers also sought to understand how this is affected by the
magnitude of the quantifier and how it is represented (Gamliel &
Kreiner, 2019). This paper adds to the limited research on how chang-
ing characteristics of the quantifier can produce different perceptions
of the overall frame. Specifically, we address how and why a quanti-
fier's format of representation and its magnitude modify the attribute
framing effect.
1.1 | Attribute frames consist of attribute and
quantifier
In this paper, we refer to a frame as a sentence that includes a quan-
tity (e.g., a proportion or percentage) of an attribute. The traditional
attribute framing paradigm typically considers the quantifier and a
positive attribute descriptor as “positive” (e.g., 75% lean), compared
with the other “negative” frame that has a complementary quantifier
and negative antonym (e.g., 25% fat; Levin & Gaeth, 1988, but see
Sher & McKenzie, 2006, for a valence-neutral construction). Explana-
tions such as the affective encoding account posit that people's judge-
ments are consistent with the valence of the attribute (e.g., positive
for 75% lean and negative for 25% fat). However, this explanation
does not sufficiently take into account the role quantifiers may play in
modifying the attributes they are attached to (Kiss & Pafel, 2017). For
instance, one would expect the magnitude of a quantifier to affect the
overall valence of the framing sentence and an item that is 5% fat
would be perceived more positively than an item that is 25% fat.
Several existing studies showed that people identified frames
with greater magnitudes of the positive descriptor (e.g., 95% lean
vs. 5% fat) to be more positive than those with smaller magnitudes of
the positive descriptor (e.g., 75% lean vs. 25% fat; e.g., Gamliel &
Kreiner, 2019; Liu et al., 2020). In one case, participants even showed
a reversal in preference between a 25% and 5% positive descriptor
(Janiszewski et al., 2003). These findings suggest that the quantity
changes the valence of the framing scenario and therefore one's eval-
uation of it. However, the consequence for the framing effect is less
straightforward to determine because complementary quantifiers—
often of differing magnitude—are paired with positive and negative
antonyms. Some studies found no difference in the framing effect size
(i.e., the difference between evaluations of the positive and negative
frames; Jin et al., 2017; Kim et al., 2014; Saad & Gill, 2014): 95% lean
is more positive than 75% lean, but the complementary 5% fat is also
less negative than 25% fat. Other studies found that 75% lean
(vs. 25% fat) displayed a larger framing effect than 95% lean (vs. 5%
fat; Gamliel & Kreiner, 2019; Liu et al., 2020; Sanford et al., 2002),
which suggests that the magnitude of the quantifier may not affect
the valence linearly. Beef that is 95% lean may be more positive than
beef that is 75% lean, but beef that is 5% fat could be much less nega-
tive than beef that is 25% fat. Comparing a positive and negative
frame with a large and small quantifier may thus not reveal the full
effect of the quantifier magnitude.
In addition to variations in magnitude, quantifiers can also exist in
different formats: numerical and verbal. Although attribute framing is
predominantly studied with numerical quantifiers, some work has
shown that framing is also possible with verbal quantifiers (Gamliel &
Kreiner, 2019; Liu et al., 2020; Welkenhuysen et al., 2001; see also
Reyna & Brainerd, 1991, for an example in risky choice framing). Vary-
ing quantifier format between numerical and verbal could moderate
the effect of frames on people's evaluations. One would expect that
verbal quantifiers might produce a larger attribute framing effect than
numerical quantifiers for two reasons. First, compared with numerical
quantifiers, verbal quantifiers (specifically, verbal probabilities) are
believed to be processed more intuitively than numerical ones
(Windschitl & Wells, 1996). For instance, people perceived “1 in
10 chance” to have different event likelihood from the equivalent “10
in 100 chance” when they described it with verbal than numerical
quantifiers (Windschitl & Wells, 1996). Framing effects demonstrate a
similar variation in judgment based on information presentation and
are argued to be fueled by intuition (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986).
Thus, the effect should be more prevalent when frames use verbal
quantifiers. Second, verbal quantifiers place more emphasis on the
context than numerical ones (Moxey, 2017), which should increase
the effect of the attribute's valence. Of the reported studies on verbal
versus numerical quantifiers in attribute framing, one study found that
attribute frames with verbal quantifiers produced a framing effect
when those with numerical quantifiers did not: participants were more
likely to prefer a prenatal test when informed that they had a moder-
ate chance of having a baby with cystic fibrosis (negative frame) than
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a high chance of having a baby without (positive frame); however,
they did not show this preference when given a 25% chance of cystic
fibrosis versus 75% chance of no cystic fibrosis (Welkenhuysen
et al., 2001). The other studies did not find evidence that verbal quan-
tifiers (e.g., moderate fat vs. high lean content) magnified the framing
effect compared with numerical quantifiers (Gamliel & Kreiner, 2019;
Liu et al., 2020).
A challenge for testing the effect of quantifier format lies in
selecting the best pair of verbal quantifiers that will make up comple-
mentary frames. Verbal quantifiers do not have precise numerical
equivalents. One could select semantic opposites such as high versus
low (Gamliel & Kreiner, 2019), but these may not be how participants
would translate the numerical quantifiers. Studies that solicited trans-
lations of numerical complements found that people indicated 75%
and 25% to be “high” and “moderate,” respectively (Liu et al., 2020;
Welkenhuysen et al., 2001) versus “very high” and “low” for 95% and
5% (Liu et al., 2020). From this, one can see that the effect of a verbal
versus numerical quantifier could be different for the positive than
the negative frame. Comparing different quantifier magnitudes for the
positive and negative frame may thus mask some of the effects of
quantifier format.
1.2 | Creating a systematic test of quantifier
characteristics
A direct, systematic test of how the characteristics of a quantifier
moderate the framing effect needs to independently manipulate the
frame, quantifier magnitude, and quantifier format. Ideally, one would
need to compare the same quantifier in the positive frame as the neg-
ative to isolate the effect of changing the quantifier characteristics.
Such an orthogonal manipulation is not straightforward,1 but it is
achievable within the broader typology of framing effects. One way
to manipulate quantifier characteristics orthogonally to attribute
valence is by using synonyms of an attribute that are either positive
or negative. This construction is most commonly used in goal framing,
which targets whether an individual is persuaded to adopt or support
a behavior by framing the same behavior (called a goal) with synony-
mous descriptors that are either positive or negative (e.g., Epley
et al., 2006; Gamliel, 2013; Krishnamurthy et al., 2001; Levin
et al., 1998; see also examples in message framing: Dardis &
Shen, 2008). For instance, people were more positive about euthana-
sia when it was described as “not prolonging life” versus the same,
but oppositely valenced “ending life” (Gamliel, 2013).
Goal framing and attribute framing differ on some conceptual and
methodological points, although the types can overlap and the typol-
ogy is not exhaustive (Levin et al., 1998). For example, goal frames tar-
get whether one is persuaded by the framing of a behavioral
consequence (or goal) as opposed to whether characteristics (attri-
butes) of an item affect one's evaluations of the item in attribute
framing (Levin et al., 1998; see also Keren, 2011, for further discus-
sion on framing classifications). Methodologically, attribute frames
rely heavily on proportional quantifiers (i.e., percentages) to achieve
logical equivalence (i.e., the same amount of the same attribute). In
contrast, goal frames can, but does not regularly, invoke quantities of
the synonymous descriptions (e.g., describing an equal monetary pay-
out as being “withheld income” vs. “bonus income”; Epley
et al., 2006). Attribute frames are also more likely to use antonyms
and goal frames synonyms (see Krishnamurthy et al., 2001, for a dis-
cussion of why goal framing should use synonyms instead of comple-
mentary antonyms to avoid confounds with attribute framing).
However, one rare example of synonym use in attribute framing
showed that participants were more likely to select the same priced
flight framed as including a carbon offset (positive frame) as compared
with a carbon tax (negative frame)2 (Hardisty et al., 2010). Despite the
synonymous attributes referring to the same value and consequence,
people still had different attitudes toward them.
As our objective was to investigate the effect of quantifier char-
acteristics, we took the approach of Hardisty et al. (2010) in order to
manipulate quantifier characteristics (format and magnitude) orthogo-
nally. To retain the aspects of attribute framing, we manipulated how
attributes of a target and assessed participants' evaluations of the tar-
gets. We conducted five experiments with three scenarios (food
labels: all five experiments; a fish farm and a company: final experi-
ment) to test the framing effect with quantified synonyms, as moder-
ated by quantifier format (i.e., numerical or verbal) and magnitude
(e.g., small or large). We also tested whether two mediators—the
affect of the frame and how much people inferred a speaker to be
positive about a target—would explain the framing effects.
1.3 | Open science statement
In line with recent scientific guidelines, the methods and analyses for
all experiments were pre-registered and can be found on the Open
Science Framework along with the materials and data (https://osf.io/
zkmy7/).
2 | EXPERIMENT 1
In Experiment 1, we had two pre-registered hypotheses.3 First, people
would judge a quantity of the positive synonym of an attribute
(energy) as healthier than when it was the same quantity of its nega-
tive synonym (calories). Second, the framing effect would be larger for
verbal than numerical quantifiers because verbal quantifiers would




One hundred and ninety participants (62% female; 71% White; ages
18–79 years, M = 32.51, SD = 14.14) were sourced from a university
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lab database. The sample size was determined a priori based on a
stopping rule of reaching either the desired sample size (N = 187) or
by a specific date. We collected three more participants than aimed
for due to the recruitment process of the lab. No analyses were per-
formed prior to the completion of data collection. Participants com-
pleted the experiment on Qualtrics at the end of an unrelated 20-min
medical survey and were compensated with £8 for the entire study.
2.1.2 | Design
Participants made judgements about food in a 2 (synonym,
between-subjects: positive or negative)  2 (quantifier format,
between-subjects: verbal or numerical)  3 (quantifier magnitude,
within-subjects: small, moderate, or large) mixed design. Participants
also judged the affect of the synonyms (calories or energy) indepen-
dently from the quantifier.
2.1.3 | Materials and procedure
We used the context of food, in which the terms “energy” and “calo-
ries” are interchangeably used (e.g., Bleich & Pollack, 2010; Bucher
et al., 2016), but “energy” has more positive connotations than “calo-
ries” (Watson et al., 2013).
Participants read the following vignette about a food product that
was labelled in one of the framing scenarios shown in Table 1. The
quantifier was given in either verbal or numerical format. The attribute
was either energy or calories. Participants read the same vignette with
the small, medium, and large quantifier described in Table 1, presented
in random order for each participant. Participants rated the healthiness
of the food on a 7-point Likert scale (1: very unhealthy, 7: very healthy).
As a measure of affective associations with the attribute, partici-
pants next rated the terms “energy” and “calories” individually on a
7-point semantic differential scale with four sets of bipolar adjectives
(e.g., bad–good; MacGregor et al., 2000). Participants also judged their
affective associations with eight filler nutrients, such as “protein” and
“sugar.” Scale reliability was excellent, Cronbach's α = 0.95 (energy)
and 0.94 (calories). We calculated the mean for the four adjectives on
the scale as a measure of affect, with higher scores indicating a more
positive affective association.
Finally, participants reported socio-demographic information,
motivation for healthy eating (Naughton et al., 2015), how frequently
they used nutrition labels, and their estimated weight and height. On
average, participants' BMI was in the slightly overweight category
(M = 25.38, SD = 7.09), and participants had positive attitudes
toward healthy eating (M = 5.14, SD = 1.02 on a 7-point scale, with
higher scores indicating more positive attitudes). Sixty-seven percent
used nutrition labels frequently.
2.2 | Results
2.2.1 | Attribute framing effect
Participants exhibited a framing effect with the attribute's synonyms,
albeit not always in the predicted direction. As shown in Figure 1, par-
ticipants' judgements of healthiness were more positive for moderate
(medium/40%) and large (high/70%) energy than for these amounts of
calories, βmoderate-quantifiers = 0.19, p = .007, Cohen's d = 0.38,
βlarge-quantifiers = 0.36, p < .001, Cohen's d = 0.78. However, we found
unexpectedly that the framing effect reversed in direction with the
small quantifiers (low/20%), with the calorie quantity judged as more
healthy than the energy quantity, βsmall-quantifiers = 0.20, p = .006,
Cohen's d = 0.41.
2.2.2 | Testing for format moderation of the
framing effect
The difference in magnitude of the framing effect between formats
was in the expected direction (greater for verbal than numerical quan-
tifiers), but the moderation was not statistically significant for any of
the three quantifier magnitudes, βsmall-quantifiers = 0.12, p = .083,
βmoderate-quantifiers = 0.02, p = .750, βlarge-quantifiers = 0.03, p = .642.
2.2.3 | Does affect explain the framing effect?
We first confirmed that participants had more positive affect for the
term “energy” than “calories,” assessed independently from their
quantifiers (Mcalories = 4.62, SD = 1.51; Menergy = 6.00, SD = 1.04),
β = 0.47, p < .001, Cohen's d = 1.07. We conducted a planned
TABLE 1 Orthogonal manipulation of quantifier format and
attribute valence to construct frames with synonymous attributes
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moderated mediation analysis to assess whether the affect associated
with the attribute predicted variations in the magnitude of the framing
effect for each of the quantifier magnitudes. This is a conditional pro-
cess model (illustrated in Figure 2) using the PROCESS macro in SPSS
(Model 15, using bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals with
5000 samples; Hayes, 2013)4 to estimate the framing effect on
healthiness judgment (direct effect), as mediated by affect (indirect
effect) and moderated by format. All variables were mean-centered
prior to analysis.
The path labelled b in Figure 2 illustrates the effect of affect on
healthiness judgment. Affect predicted healthiness with small and
large quantifiers, but not moderate ones, βsmall-quantities = 0.28,
p < .001, βmoderate-quantities = 0.12, p = .133, βlarge-quantities = 0.24,
p = .001. This was not significantly moderated by format (all ps > .05,
reported in the appendix, Table A1).
The path labelled c0 in Figure 2 illustrates the direct framing effect
on healthiness judgment, after controlling for affect. The direct fram-
ing effect on healthiness judgements was significant for large quanti-
fiers only, βsmall-quantifiers = 0.07, p = .392, βmoderate-quantifiers = 0.13,
p = .096, βlarge-quantifiers = 0.26, p < .001. This direct effect was not
moderated by format (all ps > .05, reported in the appendix,
Table A1).
The indirect effect, assessing whether affect mediated the fram-
ing effect on healthiness, showed different findings across quantifier
magnitudes. We found a significant mediation effect with small quan-
tifiers for both formats, bverbal = 0.27, 95% CI [0.54, 0.02],
bnumerical = 0.25, 95% CI [0.49, 0.05]. However, the mediation
was not significant for moderate quantifiers, bverbal = 0.12, 95% CI
[0.07, 0.34], bnumerical = 0.10, 95% CI [0.11, 0.32]. Finally, for large
quantifiers, affect significantly mediated the framing effect for verbal,
but not numerical quantifiers, bverbal = 0.32, 95% CI [0.13, 0.55],
bnumerical = 0.14, 95% CI [0.04, 0.32].
2.3 | Discussion
In Experiment 1, we found that participants associated “energy” with
significantly more positive affect than “calories,” which suggested that
these synonyms have differing valence. Using these synonyms, we
tested whether quantifier format would moderate the attribute
F IGURE 1 Effects of attribute (green circles
vs. red squares) and format (x-axis) on healthiness
judgements across three quantifier magnitudes in
Experiment 1. Error bars reflect 95% confidence
intervals. The difference between the green
circles and red squares shows the magnitude and
direction of the framing effect in each condition
[Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.
com]
F IGURE 2 Moderated mediation model used in Experiments 1 and 2a, testing whether affect mediates the effect of the attribute on
healthiness judgment, as moderated by format. The letters a, b, and c0 indicated the regression coefficients for the individual pathways in the
model. Binary variables were dummy coded (calories = 0, numerical = 0). The hypothesis testing coefficients are presented in the text and the
full model coefficients are provided in the appendix (Tables A1 and A2)
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framing effect, as explained by the greater role of affect when quanti-
fiers were verbal. We did not find the expected moderation by quanti-
fier format, and the role of affect was complex: affect significantly
mediated the framing effect for verbal and not numerical quantifiers
only when they were large. Interestingly and unexpectedly, the effect
for small quantifiers was opposite in direction from large quantifiers:
people judged low calories (negative attribute) as healthier than low
energy (positive attribute). In the next set of experiments, we sought
to test the effects of quantifier format and magnitude further and
investigate two mediators of the framing effect.
3 | EXPERIMENTS 2a–2b
The goal of the next two experiments was to test again the role
of quantifier format as a moderator of the attribute framing effect
at different magnitude levels of the quantifier. Additionally, we
tested in separate experiments two explanatory variables as media-
tors of the framing effect: affect (Experiment 2a) and whether par-
ticipants inferred the speaker to be positive about the food
(Experiment 2b). We hypothesized that for large quantifiers, the
energy quantity would be judged healthier than the calorie one,
but for small quantifiers, the calorie quantity would be judged
healthier than the energy one (2a and 2b). We also hypothesized
that verbal quantifier would produce a large framing effect because
compared with numerical quantifiers, they would increase partici-
pants' reliance on the affect associated with the attribute (2a) and
participants would more likely infer speaker positivity for verbal
quantifiers (2b).5
In these experiments, we implemented an improved design to
address a limitation of Experiment 1, where we had used verbal and
numerical percentages for energy that are on average psychologically
equivalent (Liu et al., 2019). Individual participants may have per-
ceived the verbal quantifiers differently (e.g., one might believe low
calories to be less than 20%), which would make the frames
inequivalent between formats. To control for this individual variability,
we had participants first translate the verbal percentages of energy or
calories into a numerical percentage. These translations were later
used to solicit participants' healthiness judgements in the numerical
condition. We first describe the general method across the experi-
ments, and then results for each experiment.
3.1 | Method
3.1.1 | Participants
In Experiment 2a, participants were sourced from a survey panel
(N = 194, rewarded with online vouchers) and undergraduate partici-
pant pool (N = 141, rewarded with course credit). The experiment
was powered to detect an attribute  quantifier format interaction
based on the effect size observed in Experiment 1 (f = 0.10, α = .05,
1  β = .80). We checked before combining the samples that the two
samples did not differ significantly in their response to the manipula-
tions. Participants were 59% female, 80% White, and aged 18–
76 years (M = 37.76, SD = 17.30). Their mean BMI was healthy
(M = 24.99, SD = 5.78). Participants' had slightly positive attitudes
toward healthy eating (M = 4.89, SD = 0.98) and 53% used nutrition
labels frequently.
In Experiment 2b, we sourced participants through a university
sample (N = 71, voluntary participation) and a survey panel (N = 223,
paid £0.70). We powered the sample to detect a
synonym  quantifier format interaction with effect size f = 0.10,
α = .05, 1  β = .80. We checked before combining the samples that
the two samples did not differ significantly in their response to the
manipulations. Participants were 69% female, 88% White, aged 18–
71 years (M = 37.38, SD = 13.24). Participants' BMI was on average
in the overweight category (M = 27.03, SD = 7.18). They had slightly
positive attitudes to healthy eating (M = 4.84, SD = 0.95), and 71%
used nutrition labels frequently.
3.1.2 | Design
In both experiments, participants gave healthiness judgements in a
2 (synonym, between-subjects: energy or calories)  2 (quantifier for-
mat, between-subjects: verbal or numerical)  2 (quantifier magni-
tude, within-subjects: small or large) mixed design. Compared with
Experiment 1, we manipulated only small and large quantifiers (not
moderate) because moderate quantifiers had a similar pattern of
results to large quantifiers in Experiment 1.
In Experiment 2a, participants made affect judgements for either
energy or calories (independently of the quantifier). In Experiment 2b,
participants inferred a speaker's positivity from each framed sentence
(including both quantifier and attribute) using the same mixed design
as for the healthiness judgements.
3.1.3 | Materials and procedure
In both experiments, participants first provided numerical percentages
for a low % and high % of either calories or energy.6 These transla-
tions were used as the within-subject quantifier magnitudes in the
numerical condition. As part of the translation task, participants also
provided filler translations of other quantifiers (e.g., translating 25%
fat into a verbal equivalent) to avoid our research design being trans-
parent to participants.
To distract participants from focusing on the translations they
had provided, participants next completed a filler task similar to one
used in Teigen et al. (2014). After this, participants completed the
healthiness judgment task from Experiment 1 for the small and large
quantifiers (verbal or numerical). For Experiment 2a, we also asked
participants how much they would be willing to pay for a cereal bar
with that energy (or calorie) description.7
Participants also completed a measure of the mediator variables
of interest. In Experiment 2a, this was the affect associated with the
6 HOLFORD ET AL.
attribute (energy or calories), measured on a 7-point semantic differ-
ential scale identical to Experiment 1 (scale reliability was excellent,
Cronbach's αenergy = 0.90; Cronbach's αcalories = 0.90). In Experiment
2b, the mediator variable tested was an inferred speaker's level of
positivity. Participants rated how much they agreed with three state-
ments about how positive the speaker felt about the food product:
that the participant should buy the food, that the food was healthy,
and that the product was good. Participants rated the statements on a
7-point Likert scale (1: strongly disagree, 7: strongly agree). Scale reli-
ability was good, Cronbach's α = 0.89 (small quantifiers) and 0.86
(large quantifiers). We computed an inferred speaker positivity rating
from the average of the measures.
Finally, participants provided the same socio-demographic infor-
mation and measures collected in Experiment 1.
3.2 | Results
3.2.1 | Experiment 2a
Attribute framing effects and moderation by quantifier format
We found framing effects on healthiness judgements that were oppo-
site in direction for small and large quantifiers, as shown in the top panel
of Figure 3. Participants judged large quantities of energy more
F IGURE 3 Effects of the attribute (green
circles vs. red squares) and quantifier format (x-
axis) on healthiness judgements for small and large
quantifiers in Experiments 2a (top panel), 2b
(middle panel), and 3 (bottom panel). Error bars
reflect 95% confidence intervals. The difference
between the green circles and red squares shows
the size and direction of the framing effect in each
condition [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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positively than calories, β = 0.31, p < .001, Cohen's d = 0.69. However,
the direction of the effect was reversed for small quantifiers, with calo-
riesmore healthy than energy, β = 0.37, p < .001, Cohen's d = 0.39.
Quantifier format moderated the framing effect only for small quanti-
fiers: the framing effect was found for verbal but not numerical quanti-
fiers, β = 0.31, p < .001. However, quantifier format did not moderate
the framing effect for large quantifiers, β = 0.03, p = .743.
Does affect explain the framing effect?
Participants had more positive affect for “energy” than “calories,”
each assessed independently (Mcalories = 4.12, SD = 1.46, Men-
ergy = 5.61, SD = 1.22), β = 0.49, p < .001, Cohen's d = 1.11. Using
the same moderated mediation analysis as Experiment 1, we found
that affect predicted healthiness for large but not small quantifiers,
βsmall-quantifiers = 0.12, p = .143, βlarge-quantifiers = 0.39, p < .001.
After accounting for affect, there remained a significant direct framing
effect on healthiness judgements, βsmall-quantifiers = 0.31, p < .001,
βlarge-quantifiers = 0.16, p = .042. This effect was greater for verbal than
numerical formats in the small, but not large, quantifiers, βsmall-qua-
ntifiers = 0.29, p = .008, βlarge-quantifiers = 0.01, p = .898. The condi-
tional indirect effect, testing the mediation by affect of the framing
effect on healthiness, showed no significant mediation for small quan-
tifiers, bverbal = 0.12, 95% CI [0.31, 0.06], bnumerical = 0.06, 95%
CI [0.30, 0.15]. In contrast, there was a significant mediation by
affect for large quantifiers, bverbal = 0.31, 95% CI [0.15, 0.48],
bnumerical = 0.32, 95% CI [0.15, 0.53].
3.2.2 | Experiment 2b
Attribute framing effects and moderation by format
As shown in the middle panel of Figure 3, we replicated the framing
effect on healthiness judgements. Participants judged that large quan-
tities of energy were healthier than the equivalent quantity in calories,
β = 0.37, p < .001, Cohen's d = 0.80. Small quantifiers reversed the
direction of the effect, with participants judging that calorie quantities
were healthier than energy quantities, β = 0.35, p < .001,
Cohen's d = 0.74. However, we did not find the predicted
moderation by quantifier format, βsmall-quantifiers = 0.10, p = .078,
βlarge-quantifiers = 0.04, p = .520.
Does inferred speaker positivity explain the framing effect?
We assessed participants inferences about speaker positivity for the
full quantified sentence (including the quantifier). These inferences
matched the framing effect on healthiness judgements: participants
inferred more speaker positivity for large quantities of energy versus
calories, and small quantities of calories versus energy, βsmall-qua-
ntifiers = 0.34, p < .001; βlarge-quantifiers = 0.34, p < .001. Using the
PROCESS macro in SPSS (Model 8; (Hayes, 2013), we conducted a
planned moderated mediation analysis (illustrated in Figure 4) to
assess whether inferences about the speaker's positivity predicted the
framing effect for the two quantifier magnitudes. Because participants
drew these inferences from the full frame (attribute and quantifier),
we assessed this mediator for the entire quantified phrase (e.g., “low
calories”) instead of for the independent attribute (e.g., “calories”).
Therefore, we expected quantifier format to moderate the a path
instead of the b path in Figure 4.
Inferred speaker positivity significantly predicted healthiness
judgements for both quantifier magnitudes, βsmall-quantifiers = 0.58,
p < .001; βlarge-quantifiers = 0.59, p < .001 (path b in Figure 4). After
accounting for the inferred speaker positivity, there remained a signif-
icant direct framing effect on healthiness judgements, βsmall-
quantifiers = 0.19, p = .005, βlarge-quantifiers = 0.16, p = .016. Quanti-
fier format did not moderate the direct effects, βsmall-quantifiers = 0.07,
p = .389, βlarge-quantifiers = 0.02, p = .748. The conditional indirect
effect, testing the mediation by inferred speaker positivity of the
framing effect, showed a significant mediation for small quantifiers,
bverbal = 0.51, 95% CI [0.70, 0.33], bnumerical = 0.28, 95% CI
[0.47, 0.10]; and large quantifiers: bverbal = 0.50, 95% CI [0.32,
0.70], bnumerical = 0.31, 95% CI [0.10, 0.52].
3.3 | Discussion
Our second set of experiments found mixed support for our prediction
that quantifier format would moderate the framing effect. Only for
F IGURE 4 Moderated mediation model used in Experiment 2b, testing whether inferred speaker positivity mediates the effect of attribute on
healthiness judgements, as moderated by quantifier format. The letters a, b, and c0 indicate the regression coefficients for the individual pathways
in the model. Binary variables were dummy coded (calories = 0, numerical = 0). The hypothesis testing coefficients are presented in the text and
the full model coefficients are provided in the appendix (Table A3)
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small quantifiers in Experiment 2a did we find a framing effect for ver-
bal but not numerical quantifiers (in line with Welkenhuysen
et al., 2001). In contrast, there was a consistent framing effect for large
quantifiers, whether verbal or numerical. Critically, the direction of the
framing effect was consistent with the affect associated with the attri-
bute for large quantifiers, but reversed from the attribute's affect for
small quantifiers. In addition, themediation analyses showed that affect
mediated the framing effect for large, but not small, quantifiers, while
inferred speaker positivity mediated the framing effect for both quanti-
fier magnitudes. However, the mediation analyses differed because
Experiment 2a tested the affect associated with the attribute sepa-
rately from the quantifier (e.g., “energy”) while Experiment 2b tested
the inferred speaker positivity from the full frame (e.g., “low% energy”).
Given that the framing effect was in the opposite direction to the attri-
bute's affect for small quantifiers, it is possible that the quantifier also
modified the affect of the attribute, which was not captured by our
measure. We sought to address this in Experiment 3 by measuring par-
ticipants' affective associations with the full quantified phrase (i.e., “low
% energy” as opposed to simply “energy”).
4 | EXPERIMENT 3
In Experiment 3, we sought to replicate the framing effect with the
synonyms energy and calories, expecting that large energy quantities
would be judged healthier than large calorie quantities, and vice versa
for the frames with small quantifiers. We also hypothesized that the
framing effects for each quantifier magnitude would be mediated by
both affect and inferences about speaker positivity. We also tested
again the hypothesis that verbal quantifiers would produce larger
framing effect than numerical quantifiers.8
4.1 | Method
4.1.1 | Participants
The experiment was powered to detect the smallest mediation effect
size obtained in the previous experiments (a path = 0.49,
b path = 0.16, targetN = 391; Fritz &MacKinnon, 2007).We collected
17 additional responses due to a delay in closing the survey. Four hun-
dred and eight participants (68% female, 28% male, 4% undisclosed;
86%White, aged 18–85 years,M = 35.54, SD = 12.12) completed the
experiment on Prolific Academic for £0.70. Participants' average BMI
was in the overweight category (M = 26.94, SD = 7.73) and they had
slightly positive attitudes toward healthy eating (M = 4.91, SD = 0.99).
Seventy-three percent used nutrition labels frequently.
4.1.2 | Design
We used a 2 (synonym: energy or calories, between-subjects)  2
(quantifier format: verbal or numerical, between-subjects)  2
(quantifier magnitude: small and large, within-subjects) mixed design
for all measures (healthiness judgment, affect, and inferred speaker
positivity). In contrast with the previous experiments, this design
allowed us to capture how the quantifier magnitude modified the
affect for an attribute.
4.1.3 | Materials and procedure
As in Experiments 2a and 2b, participants provided numerical transla-
tions of verbal quantifiers,9 followed by a filler task. Participants then
completed in random order: the healthiness judgment task (same as
previous experiments), the inferred speaker positivity scale (same
as Experiment 2b; Cronbach's αsmall-quantifiers = 0.90 and αlarge-qua-
ntifiers = 0.87), and the semantic differential scale for small and large
quantities (verbal or numerical, depending on condition) of either
energy or calories (Cronbach's αsmall-quantifiers = 0.90, αlarge-qua-
ntifiers = 0.87). Participants completed this set of three tasks twice
each: once for the small and once for the large quantifier, in random-
ized order. Finally, socio-demographic measures were collected.
4.2 | Results
4.2.1 | Attribute framing effects and moderation by
format
We found the expected framing effects on healthiness judgements,
illustrated in the bottom panel of Figure 3. The effect was in opposite
directions for the two quantifier magnitudes, βsmall-quantifiers = 0.37,
p < .001, Cohen's d = 0.8, βlarge-quantifiers = 0.45, p < .001, Cohen's
d = 1.00. However, we did not find the predicted moderating effects
of quantifier format, βsmall-quantifiers = 0.01, p = .886, βlarge-
quantifiers = 0.001, p = .977.
4.2.2 | Reversal of attribute framing effect between
small and large quantifiers
We conducted a planned moderation analysis to formally test for the
effect of quantifier magnitude on the framing effect with healthiness
judgements. As expected, there was a significant interaction between
attribute and quantifier magnitude. Participants judged large quanti-
ties of energy more positively than calories, but they judged small
quantities of calories more positively than energy, β = 0.52, p < .001.
4.2.3 | How much do affect and inferred speaker
positivity explain the framing effect?
The synonym and quantifier in the frame affected participants' levels of
affect and inferred speaker positivity. Large quantities of energy
elicited more positive affect and speaker positivity than large quantities
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of calories, and vice versa, βsmall-quantifiers = 0.34, p < .001, βlarge-qua-
ntifiers = 0.44, p < .001; speaker positivity: βsmall-quantifiers = 0.37,
p < .001, βlarge-quantifiers = 0.41, p < .001. We conducted a parallel
mediation model testing affect and inferred speaker positivity as medi-
ators of the framing effect on healthiness judgements using PROCESS
for SPSS (Model 4, illustrated in Figure 5; Hayes, 2013).10 The model
did not include quantifier format as a moderator since the hypothesis
that format would moderate the framing effect on healthiness judge-
ments was not supported.We opted for parallel mediators because the
existing theoretical accounts for the explanatory mechanisms of inter-
est had not specified an interactive role betweenmediators.
Affect and inferred speaker positivity both significantly predicted
healthiness judgements (the b paths in Figure 5), affect: βsmall-qua-
ntifiers = 0.45, p < .001, βlarge-quantifiers = 0.54, p < .001; speaker posi-
tivity: βsmall-quantifiers = 0.30, p < .001, βlarge-quantifiers = 0.29, p < .001.
After accounting for affect and inferred speaker positivity, there was
still a significant, though reduced, direct framing effect on healthiness
judgements, βsmall-quantifiers = 0.10, p = .005, βlarge-quantifiers = 0.09,
p = .010. The indirect effects showed a significant mediation of the
framing effect on healthiness judgment, bsmall-quantifiers = 0.53, 95%
CI [0.42, 0.21], blarge-quantifiers = 0.72, 95% CI [0.58, 0.85]. Affect
accounted for more of the mediation effects than inferred speaker
positivity (double, in the case of large quantifiers), affect: bsmall-
quantifiers = 0.31, 95% CI [0.42, 0.20], blarge-quantifiers = 0.49, 95%
CI [0.35, 0.62]; speaker positivity: bsmall-quantifiers = 0.22, 95% CI
[0.32, 0.14], blarge-quantifiers = 0.24, 95% CI [0.15, 0.33].
4.3 | Discussion
Across our experiments thus far, we produced a framing effect with
frames using the same quantity of two synonyms with different
valence, but the direction of the effect was determined by the quanti-
fier magnitude: large quantities of the positive synonym were judged
more positively than that of the negative synonym (as expected with
a framing effect), but small quantities of the negative synonym were
judged more positively than small quantities of the positive synonym.
Regarding the role of format, Experiment 3 did not find that quantifier
format significantly moderated the framing effect on healthiness judg-
ment. This was in line with Experiments 1 and 2b but in contrast with
Experiment 2a.
The use of synonyms was necessary to evaluate whether the
characteristics of quantifiers moderate the effect of framing, as we
could isolate effects for small versus large and verbal versus numerical
quantifiers. However, our investigation thus far only focused on one
set of synonyms (energy vs. calories). We thus sought to replicate and
extend our findings from the food scenario to other synonyms in the
next experiment.
5 | EXPERIMENT 4
The goal of Experiment 4 was to test whether the framing effects as
moderated by quantifier magnitude and the explanatory variables of
affect and inferred speaker positivity would generalize to other syno-
nyms. To do so, we tested the framing effect for the original energy ver-
sus calories pair as well as two different synonym pairs: utilized versus
depleted and dismissed versus fired. We pre-tested the synonym pairs
among 107 participants to check that they produced a perceived
valence difference of at least a medium size (i.e., Cohen's d = 0.50).
We hypothesized that the quantifier magnitude would moderate
a framing effect between an attribute's positive and negative syno-
nyms, with large quantities of positive synonyms judged more posi-
tively than the same negative synonyms, but small quantities of
negative synonyms judged more positively than the same positive
synonyms. Assuming the framing effects held, we planned to test if
verbal quantifiers would have a larger framing effect than numerical
ones, and if the framing effect would be mediated by participants'
level of affect and inferred speaker positivity.11
5.1 | Method
5.1.1 | Participants
We collected and stopped data collection once we had 408 participants
(targeted to match the sample of Experiment 3). Participants were
F IGURE 5 Parallel mediation model testing whether affect and inferred speaker positivity mediate the effect of the attribute on healthiness
judgment. The letters a, b, and c0 indicate the regression coefficients for the respective pathways in the model. Binary variables were dummy
coded (calories = 0). The hypothesis testing coefficients are presented in the text and the full model coefficients are provided in the appendix
(Table A4). Note: We tested this model for each quantifier magnitude (small and large) in Experiment 3. In Experiment 4, we added quantifier
magnitude as a moderator of the a and c0 paths in this model
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150 psychology undergraduate students, who received course credits,
and 258 respondents from Prolific Academic, who received £1 for par-
ticipation. Before combining the samples for analysis, we confirmed
that the two samples did not differ significantly in their response to the
manipulations. Participants were aged 18–71 years (M = 29.05,
SD = 10.74), 70% female, and 74%White. Following our pre-registered
criterion, we excluded from analyses involving quantifier magnitude
cases where participants perceived the two numerical quantifiers to be
verbally equivalent, as there would be no difference in the small and
large quantifiers for these cases. This resulted in 7 (1.7%) exclusions for
the food scenario, 17 (4.2%) for the fish farm scenario, and 24 (5.9%)
for the business scenario. A robustness check of the same analyses
including these cases did not change the nature of our results.
5.1.2 | Design
We used the 2 (synonym: positive or negative, between-subjects)  2
(quantifier format: verbal or numerical, between-subjects)  2 (quanti-
fier magnitude, small and large, within-subjects) design of Experiment
3, repeated across three framing scenarios (see Table 2).
5.1.3 | Materials
Prior to the experiment, we pre-tested three synonym pairs with
107 participants to assess the difference in their valence: energy ver-
sus calories, utilized versus depleted, and dismissed versus fired.
Materials and results for this pre-test are summarized in Table 2, with
a full report available as supporting information. All the synonym pairs
produced a significant valence difference of d > 0.50.12
5.1.4 | Procedure
Participants first completed a translation task, followed by a 3- to
5-min distractor task, and then the following tasks presented in ran-
dom order to each participant: a favorability judgment task, an affec-
tive judgment task, and an inferred speaker positivity task. Finally,
participants provided socio-demographic information.
Translation task
To extend our findings to numerical-verbal translations, we reversed
the translation task in the previous experiments such that participants
provided verbal quantifiers that best expressed the numerical quanti-
fiers of the framed attribute. For example, participants selected which
of the verbal quantifiers, low, moderate, or high, best described “15%
energy” (positive small condition) or “65% energy” (positive large con-
dition). We used 15% and 65% because these were average transla-
tions of low % and high % found in the previous four experiments
reported here. Participants provided translations for 15% and 65% for
all three of the framing scenarios (described in Table 2). Each partici-
pants' translations were subsequently used to construct the frames in
the verbal quantifier condition.
Framing effect measure: Attitude favorability task
We assessed the framing effect by asking participants to rate their
attitude toward the described target (the food, the fish farm, or the
business) on a 7-point Likert scale (1: not at all favorable, 7: very favor-
able). This measure maintained a constant value judgment across the
three scenarios and allowed us to test whether the framing effects
observed in Experiments 1–3 would extend to a different type of
judgment.
Mediator variable measure: Affect association task
For each scenario (featuring both attribute and quantifier), participants
completed a semantic differential scale with four bipolar adjective
anchors as in Experiment 3. Scale reliability was excellent for all sce-
narios and quantifiers, Cronbach's α ≥ 0.91. We calculated the mean
of the four items as each participant's level of affect associated with
the frame.
Mediator variable measure: Inferred speaker positivity task
For each scenario, participants inferred whether the speaker was posi-
tive about the target by rating their level of agreement with three
statements reflecting the speaker's positive attitude (as in Experi-
ments 2b and 3; for example: “The speaker believes the fish farm's
practices are good”). Scale reliability was good for all scenarios and
quantifiers, Cronbach's α ≥ 0.89. We calculated the mean of the three
items for each participant, with a higher mean score meaning greater
agreement that the speaker was positive toward the target.







size (d) Example scenario
Label on food product. Energy Calories 1.54*** This food provides 15% of your daily calories.




Dismissed Fired 0.63** The company fired 15% of its employees.
Note: The quantifier was either small or large (e.g., 15% vs. 65%) and verbal or numerical (e.g., a low % vs. 15%).
**p < .01. ***p < .001.
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5.2 | Results
We tested for three hypotheses. First, we expected a framing effect
on participants' attitudes about the scenarios that was larger in the
verbal than the numerical condition. Second, we expected the framing
effect would be opposite in direction for the small versus large quanti-
fiers. Third, we expected that affect and inferred speaker positivity
would mediate the framing effect.
5.2.1 | Attribute framing effect and moderation by
quantifier characteristics
We found that the synonym significantly affected participants' atti-
tudes, moderated by the quantifier magnitude, in two out of three
scenarios (food and fish farm, but not business), as illustrated in
Figure 6, βfood = 0.36, p < .001, βfish-farm = 0.35, p < .001,
βbusiness = 0.04, p = .190. Participants had more favorable attitudes
toward large quantities of energy and utilized fish stocks versus the
equivalent but more negative calories and depleted fish stocks, βlarge-
food-quantities = 0.41, p < .001, Cohen's d = 0.89, βlarge-fish-
quantities = 0.51, p < .001, Cohen's d = 1.17. Conversely, they had
more favorable attitudes toward small quantities of calories and
depleted fish stocks versus the equivalent but more positive energy
and utilized fish stocks, βsmall-food-quantities = 0.31, p < .001, Cohen's
d = 0.63, βsmall-fish-quantities = 0.18, p < .001, Cohen's d = 0.37. In
the business scenario, we did not observe the hypothesized framing
effect for the quantities of employees dismissed versus fired, βsmall-
employee-quantities = 0.08, p = .095, Cohen's d = 0.15, βlarge-employee-
quantities = 0.01, p < .812, Cohen's d = 0.04. We do not report fur-
ther analyses on the business scenario.
Regarding the quantifier format, the moderating effect was incon-
sistent. Quantifier format significantly moderated the framing effect
on favorability judgements for large quantifiers in the food and fish
farm scenarios, but unexpectedly, it was the numerical quantifiers that
exhibited the bigger framing effect compared with the verbal quanti-
fiers, βlarge-food-quantities = 0.10, p = .029, βlarge-fish-quantities = 0.10,
p = .023. There was no significant moderation by quantifier format
for small quantifiers, βsmall-food-quantities = 0.001, p = .989, βsmall-fish-
quantities = 0.06, p = .232.
5.2.2 | How much do affect and inferred speaker
positivity explain the framing effect?
Similar to their attitudes, participants' levels of affect and inferred
speaker positivity were more positive for large quantities of positive
than negative synonyms, affect: βlarge-food-quantities = 0.42, p < .001,
βlarge-fish-quantities = 0.54 p < .001; speaker positivity: βlarge-food-
quantities = 0.41, p < .001,, βlarge-fish-quantities = 0.49, p < .001. Con-
versely, these measures were less positive for small quantities of neg-
ative than positive synonyms, affect: βsmall-food-quantities = 0.16,
p < .001, βsmall-fish-quantities = 0.10, p = .039, speaker positivity:
βsmall-food-quantities = 0.22, p < .001, βsmall-fish-quantities = 0.17,
p < .001.
We performed planned moderated mediation analyses on partici-
pants' attitudes in the food and fish farm scenarios, using the model
illustrated in Figure 5, to which we added quantifier magnitude as a
moderator of the framing effects on judgements, affect, and inferred
speaker positivity (c0 and a paths in Figure 5). The analysis used PRO-
CESS for SPSS (Model 8, Hayes, 2013).13
Affect and inferred speaker positivity both significantly predicted
participants' attitudes in the food and fish farm scenarios (b paths in
Figure 5), affect: βfood = 0.53, p < .001, βfish = 0.43, p < .001; speaker
positivity: βfood = 0.24, p < .001, βfish = 0.31, p < .001. After account-
ing for affect and inferred speaker positivity, the direct moderated
framing effect on attitude was still consistently significant, but
reduced, βfood = 0.18, p < .001, βfish = 0.15, p < .001. The indirect
framing effects on attitudes (conditional on quantifier magnitude)
showed that affect and inferred speaker positivity were statistically
significant mediators in the two scenarios for both the small and large
quantifiers: for the food scenario, affect: bsmall-quantifiers = 0.15, 95%
CI [0.25, 0.06], blarge-quantifiers = 0.48, 95% CI [0.36, 0.61], speaker
positivity: bsmall-quantifiers = 0.10, 95% CI [0.16, 0.05],
blarge-quantifiers = 0.21, 95% CI [0.14, 0.29]; for the fish farm scenario,
affect: bsmall-quantifiers = 0.08, 95% CI [0.15, 0.004],
blarge-quantifiers = 0.51, 95% CI [0.40, 0.65], speaker positivity:
bsmall-quantifiers = 0.10, 95% CI [0.16, 0.04], blarge-quantifiers = 0.32,
95% CI [0.22, 0.43]. This indicated that participants' affective associa-
tions with the frame and inferences about the speaker's positivity
both partly explained differences in attitudes between the frames. A
test of how quantifier magnitude moderated this mediation (i.e., the
difference between conditional indirect effects) showed that this
mediating role was greater for the large than the small quantifiers,
affect: bfood = 0.63, 95% CI [0.47, 0.79], bfish = 0.59, 95% CI [0.45,
0.75]; speaker positivity: bfood = 0.31, 95% CI [0.21, 0.43],
bfish = 0.42, 95% CI [0.29, 0.56].
Thus, overall, Experiment 4 supported our hypotheses that the
direction of the framing effect reversed between small and large
quantifiers and that affect and inferred speaker positivity mediated
the framing effect. The evidence was consistent across two scenarios
with different synonym pairs. However, we did not find the expected
greater framing effect for verbal than numerical quantifiers.
6 | GENERAL DISCUSSION
In five pre-registered experiments, we found three main findings.
First, we consistently replicated a framing effect for the synonyms
“energy” and “calories.” We showed that it extended to another syno-
nym pair (“utilized” vs. “depleted”), though not the pair “dismissed”
versus “fired.” Second, we found that verbal quantifiers did not trigger
larger framing effects than numerical quantifiers. Third, we found that
the magnitude of quantifiers moderated the direction of the framing
effect, producing framing effects opposite in direction to the valence
of the independent attribute. Affect and inferred speaker positivity
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mediated the framing effect more for large quantifiers than small
ones, highlighting that the quantifier makes an important contribution
to the framing effect and the mechanisms behind it. Here, we discuss
these findings in terms of their implications for psychological mecha-
nisms behind framing, and considerations for future framing research.
6.1 | Framing effects with attribute synonyms
Our experiments differed from typical attribute framing studies in that
we did not use numerical complements and antonyms. We departed
from the usual approach as this allowed us to test the effect of
F IGURE 6 Participants' attitudes (1: not at all
favorable, 7: very favorable) toward a food (top
panel), fish farm (middle panel), and company
(bottom panel) described with positive versus
negative synonymous attributes (green circle
vs. red square) in Experiment 4 [Colour figure can
be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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quantifier magnitude orthogonally to that of attribute valence. Our
approach using synonyms that differed in valence was atypical, but
not without precedent: synonyms were used in studies classified
under goal framing (e.g., Epley et al., 2006) and attribute framing
(e.g., Hardisty et al., 2010). Given our departure from the typical attri-
bute research design, it is important to state the implications of our
findings for the attribute framing literature as well as for other forms
of framing effect such as goal framing.
Our synonyms depicted the same proportion of the same attri-
bute in both frames. For example, we depicted the same proportion of
fish harvested as either 15% utilization or 15% depletion. This is in
contrast to the traditional attribute frame, which might depict the sce-
nario as 15% depletion versus 85% conservation. These scenarios lead
to the same proportions as in all of them, 15% of fish are gone and
85% remain. However, psychologically, the frames are perceived dif-
ferently, producing the framing effect. We found a robust effect with
two pairs of synonyms (d = 0.3–0.8), comparable with the antonym
frames in the literature. The last pair, which had the smallest valence
difference between the less negative “dismissed” and the more nega-
tive “fired,” did not produce a framing effect. This suggests that syno-
nyms need to show a sufficient valence difference, enough to
distinguish the positive and negative frames. This may apply as well
to antonym frames, where certain scenarios that are more clearly pos-
itive or negative find smaller or no effects (e.g., Gamliel &
Kreiner, 2019; Liu et al., 2020).
One may argue, however, that although the terms “energy” and
“calories” describe an equivalent dietary contribution from the food,
the frames do not convey the same meaning to the recipient. People
may infer additional information from a speaker's choice of frame, for
example, a glass described as half-full is believed to mean that it was
empty before (Sher & McKenzie, 2008), or 25% fat may be inferred to
be at least that much fat (as opposed to exactly so; Mandel, 2014). As
a result, antonym frames would not be informationally equivalent
because one can infer there is more fat (or water) in the negative
frame and less in the positive. With synonyms, because the quantities
in both frames are the same, these inferences should act in the same
direction: the food has at least 15% of the calories (or at least 15% of
the energy) you need. However, the synonyms may result in informa-
tional non-equivalence through other reasoning about the speaker's
choice of frame. One can infer that a speaker used a positive descrip-
tor because they recommend a certain course of action (Hilton, 2008;
van Buiten & Keren, 2009)—thus, energy provided is meant to be con-
sumed, whereas calories provided are meant to be avoided. These
inferences about what a speaker might recommend overlap with the
conceptual criteria for goal framing, which has a focus on persuading
individuals to support or adopt behaviors (Levin et al., 1998). While
our experiments do not strictly align with goal framing in terms of
what is framed and the target response, the two types of framing
often overlap and are not exclusive. An information leakage perspec-
tive of framing effects with synonym frames could thus extend to goal
framing, where two goal frames have different meanings for individ-
uals because they reflect a speaker's recommendations. Considering
how attribute and goal frames are constructed—using synonyms or
antonyms—could provide more insight into the mechanisms shared by
the two types of framing, and help explain studies with overlapping
framing characteristics (e.g., Hardisty et al., 2010; Welkenhuysen
et al., 2001).
6.2 | Quantifier characteristics and the framing
effect
Quantifiers play an important role in modifying one's perception of an
attribute (Kiss & Pafel, 2017). Using synonyms of relative positive or
negative valence to maintain the same quantifier across frames, we
found that the magnitude of quantifiers consistently interacted with
the synonym's valence. This is consistent with other research where
people were sensitive to whether a scenario on the whole was posi-
tive or negative, rather than just the attribute (e.g., people evaluated
“65% didn't fail” as better than “35% didn't pass”; Kreiner &
Gamliel, 2019). Our experiments showed there was a reversal in
judgements of the negative synonym when it had a small versus a
large (or medium) quantifier. For example, we observed that judge-
ments of calories tended to shift more depending on whether there
were large or small amounts. When assessed on its own, the term
“calories” received affect judgements around the center of the scale,
so it was actually the less valenced term of the pair, but it was more
negative than energy. It may be that negatively valenced terms are
more sensitive to modification by quantifier magnitude—which could
also explain why we did not find an effect with the fired versus dis-
missed synonyms, both of which are negative.
Compared with synonym attribute frames, research using anto-
nym frames did not find consistent moderating effects of quantifier
magnitude. Some found differences in the framing effect size
(Gamliel & Kreiner, 2019; Liu et al., 2020; Sanford et al., 2002); others
did not (Jin et al., 2017; Kim et al., 2014; Saad & Gill, 2014). Past stud-
ies often expected that a frame's valence would match the attribute's
valence (e.g., any quantity of fat is more negatively valenced than
complementary percentage of “lean”). However, we provided here
evidence that with some combinations of quantities, the smaller quan-
tity could reverse the frame's valence, thereby reducing, or possibly
even cancelling, the difference in valence perception. For example, a
negative frame of 5% fat is in fact positive—then raising the question:
is it less positive than a 95% lean frame? If it is not, this could explain
why the framing effect was smaller or disappeared for more extreme
antonym frame combinations (Gamliel & Kreiner, 2019; Liu
et al., 2020), while studies that use more moderate combinations
(e.g., 40% vs. 60%) might not reflect an impact of the quantifier. Our
findings highlight the need to check how the valence of the quantified
attribute compares with the valence of the descriptor alone. This is
important not just to attribute framing, but other framing types
(e.g., goal framing) that may use quantifiers in the frame.
Our experiments also found that quantifier magnitude affected
the extent to which affect and inferred speaker positivity explained
the framing effect. Both the mediators operated in parallel, but media-
tion effects were greater for the large quantifiers, especially when
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mediated by affect. From this, we suggest that quantifier characteris-
tics could also moderate the mechanisms by which people reach a
judgment. For instance, affect more consistently predicted judge-
ments for large than small quantifiers (in Experiments 1, 2a, 3, and 4).
However, inferred speaker positivity consistently predicted judge-
ments for both quantifier magnitudes (Experiments 2b, 3, and 4). This
could indicate that although both factors contribute to people's judge-
ments, people make more affective judgements with large than small
quantifiers. These effects are consistent with both affect encoding
and pragmatic explanations. With large quantifiers, a valence-
consistent shift in attitudes could be more prevalent as the affect
associated with the attribute matches the affect for the entire quanti-
fied frame. People can also integrate pragmatic inferences about how
quantities are usually phrased: in terms of how much there is rather
than how little (Clark & Clark, 1977). Thus small quantifiers act as a
pragmatic marker for people to consider other aspects of the informa-
tion, such as what the speaker might believe. The affective and prag-
matic accounts may also relate to each other: if people perceive more
positivity from a speaker, that could contribute to positive feelings
about the target (Hilton, 2008; Hilton et al., 2005). Conversely, one
might also infer that the positive affect they associate with the quanti-
fied frame is why speakers used positively valenced wording to
describe the scenario. We do not know yet how the processes might
interact, but having determined their contributory roles, we propose
that future research examines the interplay of the two. Because our
studies relied on mediation analyses, an important limitation is the
reliance on correlations between dependent variables (affect, infer-
ence, and judgements) that cannot determine whether these variables
have a causal effect on any of the others. One way to disentangle this
in future work may be to manipulate each variable (e.g., the need to
infer speaker positivity) by presenting participants with the speaker's
actual opinions, and testing how this affects subsequent judgment.
A hypothesis we did not find support for was that larger framing
effects would be found when words were used instead of numbers.
We only found this in one study (2a), but we also found the opposite
in another study (4), where the framing effect was greater for the
numerical than verbal quantifiers, and there were no significant mod-
eration effects in the other studies. Our results suggest there is not a
difference in framing effect size between verbal and numerical quanti-
fiers, similar to recent work with typical antonym frames by Gamliel
and Kreiner (2019) and Liu et al. (2020)—but contrasting with findings
of Welkenhuysen et al. (2001). Verbal quantifiers may not be
processed more intuitively than numerical ones, at least not to the
extent that it would magnify the framing effect.
In our mediation tests, we also found that the quantifier format
affected neither participants' affect for the attribute frame nor what
they inferred about speaker positivity, meaning quantifier format
failed to magnify the affect or pragmatic signal as we had predicted.
We had expected that verbal quantifiers would magnify these signals
based on the evidence that verbal quantifiers produce more deviation
from normative judgment (Windschitl & Wells, 1996), increase atten-
tion on the context (Moxey, 2017), and possess more pragmatic sig-
naling value (Teigen & Brun, 1995, 2000). A reason why our findings
were not as expected may be that many of these studies investigated
a specific type of verbal quantifier: probabilities (e.g., pragmatic signal-
ing: Teigen & Brun, 1995, 2000; intuitive judgements: Windschitl &
Wells, 1996)—which suggests that verbal probabilities differ from
other verbal quantifiers. Supporting this difference, recent evidence
indicates that proportional verbal quantifiers, as used in our study, are
similar to numerical quantifiers in what pragmatic focus they place on
attributes in a frame (Liu et al., 2020). Another explanation to consider
relates to the overlap between attribute and goal framing using anto-
nyms or synonyms. Welkenhuysen et al.'s (2001) study with antonyms
(25% chance of disease vs. 75% chance of no disease), which found a
greater effect with verbal quantifiers, also targeted participants' sup-
port for a medical procedure. Their framing scenario thus overlaps
with goal framing, and so it could be possible that quantifier format
affects goal framing mechanisms rather than attribute framing ones.
6.3 | Limitations and future directions
Our five experiments showed that synonyms with different valence
produce framing effects comparable with attribute framing with com-
plementary antonyms, and the quantifier (but not its format) modified
the frame's valence to produce a framing effect different in direction
for small versus large quantifiers. The quantifier's magnitude also
determined participants' affect and inferred speaker positivity for the
frame, both of which contributed to judgment differences. These
findings suggest that first, it is important to check how quantifier mag-
nitude modifies the valence of the overall phrase, as this could affect
framing effects even for complementary antonyms. Second, existing
accounts and evidence for framing effects could overlap and operate
in tandem, so integrating different accounts and typologies could pro-
vide a more nuanced view of the mechanisms behind attribute
framing.
A limitation of our work is that we did not test more quantifier
magnitudes in steadily increasing intervals, because this was not prac-
tical with verbal quantifiers, which have less precise increments
(Budescu & Wallsten, 1995). We therefore cannot identify if the
effect would shrink and disappear before reversing in direction. Given
that medium quantifiers had similar effects to large quantifiers (and
also, complementary antonyms find an effect using 50%, e.g., full
vs. empty; Ingram et al., 2014), the reversal may only occur at a rela-
tively small value. From a pragmatic perspective, one would likely
draw more inferences as the informational quantity becomes more
ambiguous (Grodner & Sedivy, 2011; Liu et al., 2020). The less clearly
positive or negative a set of frames, the more ambiguity there may be
for the evaluation, which should produce larger framing effects. Test-
ing for levels of ambiguity of different quantifier magnitudes would be
another promising avenue to understand how the quantifier magni-
tude modifies frame valence.
We also see merit in examining whether other posited explana-
tions for attribute framing, such as fuzzy-trace theory (Reyna &
Brainerd, 1991), can apply to synonym frames. Our findings do not
suggest that participants' used the “gist” of the information (e.g., the
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food has some energy) instead of the verbatim representations
(i.e., the exact information: 15% energy) in their judgment. Sensitivity
to quantifier magnitude is posited to be evidence of using verbatim
representations in antonym frames (Gamliel & Kreiner, 2019), and our
participants' evaluations consistently changed with the quantifier
magnitude. However, because the quantities were identical in both
frames, it is possible that people encode the modified valence in the
gist of the information as well. We propose that future investigations
target these different explanations to better understand how different
mechanisms apply to different types of framing effects.
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1 Using the classic attribute framing design of complementary antonyms,
only one quantity can be the same in both frames: 50%. One would
not be able to effectively determine how increasing or decreasing the
quantifier magnitude affects the overall valence, because increasing
the positive attribute to 60% means decreasing the negative attribute
to 40%.
2 While this study is classified in the literature as attribute framing, we
agree with a reviewer who pointed out that it shares characteristics of
goal framing.
3 The experiment pre-registration can be found at this link: https://osf.
io/ncq3m/.
4 Because PROCESS does not provide replicable syntax, we replicated
the individual mediation paths in Figure 2 in R and provide this code
on the OSF (https://osf.io/wqyf3/).
5 The experiment pre-registration can be found at the following links:
https://osf.io/ds5zp/ (2a) and https://osf.io/pvfm2/ (2b).
6 The average numerical translations were similar to the ones used in
Experiment 1 (low: M = 19.47%, SD = 21.20; high: M = 66.63%,
SD = 23.07). Translations of energy were not significantly different to
those of calories, low: t(620) = 0.97, p = .333, high: t
(1034.5) = 0.35, p = .726.
7 We did not produce a framing effect for the willingness-to-pay mea-
sure, perhaps because consumers do not necessarily prefer buying
healthier products (Raghunathan et al., 2006). This highlights the need
for dependent measures to bear sufficient relation to the framing task
at hand (e.g., energy/calories are important to determining if a food is
healthy; Graham & Jeffery, 2011, but other elements affect the deter-
mination of price; Talati et al., 2017).
8 The experiment pre-registration can be found at the following link:
https://osf.io/6vw3g/.
9 Participants did not translate low % and high % significantly differently
for energy and calories, low: t(389) = 1.23, p = .220; high: t
(402) = 1.41, p = .159. The average numerical translations were
14.74% (SD = 13.07) for low and 68.15% (SD = 21.44) for high.
10 We had planned a moderated mediation model (PROCESS Model 8)
conditional on this assumption. Since the assumption was not met, we
carried out the plan for a model without mediators and do not report a
moderated model. However, we include coefficients for the moderated
model as supporting information.
11 The experiment pre-registration can be found at the following link:
https://osf.io/4gh8n/.
12 The pre-test also tested the valence differences of five complementary
attribute pairs previously published in traditional attribute framing
tasks. Four of these had effect sizes between d = 1.27 (lean vs. fat) and
d = 5.04 (satisfied vs. dissatisfied). One previously used (successful)
complementary attribute pair had a non-significant valence difference
(d = 0.20: wool vs. artificial fiber).
13 We had also pre-registered as an alternative model a moderated media-
tion analysis that included quantifier format. However, this model did
not find that quantifier format played a moderating role (βfood = 0.01,
p = .800, βfish = 0.02, p = 329). It also did not explain more variance
than the analysis reported here (both R2 = 0.56).
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APPENDIX A.
TABLE A1 Effect of frame and
quantifier format on affect and
healthiness judgements in tests of
moderated mediation for three quantifier
magnitudes in Experiment 1
β p b 95% CI
Effect on affect (R2 = .22, p < .001)
Frame (a path) 0.47 < .001 0.94 0.59, 1.20
Effect on healthiness
Small quantifiers (R2 = .11, p < .001)
Direct effects
Affect  quantifier format (b path) 0.02 .903 0.02 0.30, 0.34
Frame  quantifier format (c0 path) 0.15 .067 0.58 0.04, 1.20
Indirect effect (mediation by affect)
Verbal quantifiers - - 0.27 0.54, 0.02
Numerical quantifiers - - 0.25 0.49, 0.05
Medium quantifiers (R2 = .15, p < .001)
Direct effects
Affect  quantifier format (b path) 0.02 .897 0.02 0.34, 0.30
Frame  quantifier format (c0 path) 0.02 .846 0.06 0.55, 0.67
Indirect effect (mediation by affect)
Verbal quantifiers - - 0.12 0.07, 0.34
Numerical quantifiers - - 0.10 0.11, 0.32
Large quantifiers (R2 = .29, p < .001)
Direct effects
Affect  quantifier format 0.14 .201 0.19 0.48, 0.10
Frame  quantifier format 0.01 .907 0.03 0.59, 0.53
Indirect effect (mediation by affect)
Verbal quantifiers - - 0.32 0.13, 0.55
Numerical quantifiers - - 0.14 0.04, 0.32
Note: PROCESS Model 15 (Hayes, 2013) was used to generate unstandardized coefficients, 95%
bootstrapped confidence intervals (based on 5000 simulations), and p values. Figure 2 illustrates the
corresponding pathways for each of the effects in the model. The a path is the direct effect of frame on
affect; the b path is the direct effect of affect on healthiness; the c0 path is the direct effect of frame on
healthiness after accounting for the mediated pathway.
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TABLE A2 Effect of frame and
quantifier format on affect and
healthiness judgements in tests of
moderated mediation for small and large
quantifiers in Experiment 2a
β p b 95% CI
Effect on affect (R2 = 0.24, p < .001)
Frame (a path) 0.49 < .001 0.97 0.78, 1.16
Effect on healthiness
Small quantifiers (R2 = 0.08, p < .001)
Direct effects
Affect  quantifier format (b path) 0.29 .008 0.65 0.18, 1.13
Frame  quantifier format (c0 path) 0.06 .560 0.07 0.17, 0.31
Indirect effect (mediation by affect)
Verbal quantifiers - - 0.12 0.31, 0.06
Numerical quantifiers - - 0.06 0.30, 0.15
Large quantifiers (R2 = 0.19, p < .001)
Direct effects
Affect  quantifier format (b path) 0.02 .874 0.02 0.21, 0.24
Frame  quantifier format (c0 path) 0.01 .898 0.03 0.42, 0.48
Indirect effect (mediation by affect)
Verbal quantifiers - - 0.31 0.15, 0.48
Numerical quantifiers - - 0.32 0.15, 0.53
Note: PROCESS Model 15 (Hayes, 2013) was used to generate unstandardized coefficients, 95%
bootstrapped confidence intervals (based on 5000 simulations), and p values. Figure 2 illustrates the
corresponding pathways for each of the effects in the models. The a path is the direct effect of frame on
affect; the b path is the direct effect of affect on healthiness; the c0 path is the direct effect of frame on
healthiness after accounting for the mediated pathway.
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TABLE A3 Effect of frame and
quantifier format on inferred speaker
positivity and healthiness judgements in
tests of moderated mediation for small
and large quantifiers in Experiment 2b
β p b 95% CI
Effect on inferred speaker positivity
Small quantifiers (R2 = .13, p < .001)
Frame  quantifier format (moderated a path) 0.17 .068 0.40 0.03, 0.83
Large quantifiers (R2 = .13, p < .001)
Frame  quantifier format (moderated a path) 0.14 .132 0.33 0.76, 0.10
Effect on healthiness
Small quantifiers (R2 = .43, p < .001)
Direct effects
Inferred speaker positivity (b path) 0.58 < .001 0.58 0.48, 0.67
Frame  quantifier format (moderated c0 path) 0.07 .389 0.15 0.20, 0.51
Indirect effect (mediation by inferred speaker positivity)
Verbal quantifiers - - 0.51 0.70, 0.33
Numerical quantifiers - - 0.28 0.47, 0.10
Large quantifiers (R2 = .45, p < .001)
Direct effects
Inferred speaker positivity (b path) 0.59 < .001 0.59 0.50, 0.69
Frame  quantifier format (moderated c0 path) 0.02 .748 0.06 0.29, 0.40
Indirect effect (mediation by inferred speaker positivity)
Verbal quantifiers - - 0.50 0.32, 0.70
Numerical quantifiers - - 0.31 0.10, 0.52
Note: PROCESS Model 8 (Hayes, 2013) was used to generate unstandardized coefficients, 95%
bootstrapped confidence intervals (based on 5000 simulations), and p values. Figure 4 illustrates the
corresponding pathways for each of the effects in the model. The a path is the direct effect of frame on
inferred speaker positivity, moderated by quantifier format; the b path is the direct effect of inferred
speaker positivity on healthiness; the c0 path is the direct effect of frame (moderated by quantifier
format) on healthiness after accounting for the mediated pathway.
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TABLE A4 Effect of frame on affect,
inferred speaker positivity, and
healthiness judgements in tests of
mediation for small and large quantifiers
in Experiment 3
β p b 95% CI
Effect of frame on affect (a path)
Scenario
Small quantifiers (R2 = 0.11, p < .001) 0.34 < .001 0.68 0.86, 0.49
Large quantifiers (R2 = 0.20, p < .001) 0.44 < .001 0.88 0.71, 1.06
Effect of frame on inferred speaker positivity (a path)
Small quantifiers (R2 = 0.14, p < .001) 0.37 < .001 0.75 0.93, 0.57
Large quantifiers (R2 = 0.17, p < .001) 0.41 < .001 0.83 0.65, 1.00
Effect on healthiness
Quantity: Small (R2 = .53, p < .001)
Direct effects
Frame (c0 path) 0.10 .005 0.21 0.36, 0.07
Affect (b path) 0.45 < .001 0.45 0.37, 0.54
Inferred speaker positivity (b path) 0.30 < .001 0.30 0.21, 0.39
Indirect effects (mediation)
Mediation by affect - - 0.31 0.42, 0.20
Mediation by inferred speaker positivity - - 0.22 0.32, 0.14
Total mediation effect - - 0.53 0.42, 0.21
Quantity: Large (R2 = .64, p < .001)
Direct effects
Frame (c0 path) 0.09 .010 0.18 0.04, 0.31
Affect (b path) 0.54 < .001 0.54 0.47, 0.62
Inferred speaker positivity (b path) 0.29 < .001 0.29 0.21, 0.36
Indirect (mediation) effects
Mediation by affect - - 0.48 0.35, 0.62
Mediation by inferred speaker positivity - - 0.24 0.15, 0.33
Total mediation effect - - 0.72 0.58, 0.85
Note: PROCESS Model 8 (Hayes, 2013) was used to generate unstandardized coefficients, 95%
bootstrapped confidence intervals (based on 5000 simulations), and p values. Figure 5 illustrates the
corresponding pathways for each of the effects in the model. The a path is the direct effect of frame on
the respective mediators (1: affect, 2: inferred speaker positivity); the b path is the direct effect of each
of the mediators on healthiness; the c0 path is the direct effect of frame on healthiness after accounting
for the mediated pathways.
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TABLE A5 Effect of frame and quantifier magnitude on affect, inferred speaker positivity, and favorable attitude in tests of moderated
mediation on two scenarios in Experiment 4
β p b 95% CI
Effect of frame and quantifier magnitude on affect (moderated a path)
Scenario
Food (R2 = 0.11, p < .001) 0.44 < .001 0.02 0.02, 0.03
Fish farm (R2 = 0.20, p < .001) 0.51 < .001 0.03 0.02, 0.03
Effect of frame on inferred speaker positivity (moderated a path)
Scenario
Food (R2 = 0.11, p < .001) 0.47 < .001 0.03 0.02, 0.03
Fish farm (R2 = 0.16, p < .001) 0.51 < .001 0.03 0.02, 0.03
Effect on favorable attitudes
Scenario: Food (R2 = .56, p < .001)
Direct effects
Frame  quantifier magnitude (moderated c0 path) 0.18 <.001 0.01 0.006, 0.014
Affect (b path) 0.53 <.001 0.53 0.47, 0.59
Inferred speaker positivity (b path) 0.24 <.001 0.24 0.18, 0.30
Indirect effects (mediation)
Mediation by affect
Small quantifiers - - 0.15 0.25, 0.06
Large quantifiers - - 0.48 0.36, 0.61
Mediation by inferred speaker positivity
Small quantifiers - - 0.10 0.16, 0.0
Large quantifiers - - 0.21 0.14, 0.29
Scenario: Fish farm (R2 = .53, p < .001)
Direct effects
Frame  quantifier magnitude (moderated c0 path) 0.15 <.001 0.01 0.004, 0.012
Affect (b path) 0.43 <.001 0.43 0.37, 0.50
Inferred speaker positivity (b path) 0.31 <.001 0.31 0.24, 0.37
Indirect (mediation) effects
Mediation by affect
Small quantifiers - - 0.08 0.15, 0.004
Large quantifiers - - 0.51 0.40, 0.65
Mediation by inferred speaker positivity
Small quantifiers - - 0.10 0.16, 0.04
Large quantifiers - - 0.32 0.23, 0.43
Note: PROCESS Model 8 (Hayes, 2013) was used to generate unstandardized coefficients, 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals (based on 5000
simulations), and p values. This model is similar to that illustrated in Figure 5, but with quantifier magnitude included as a moderator of the a and c0 paths.
The a path is the direct moderated effect of frame on the respective mediators (affect and inferred speaker positivity); the b path is the direct effect of
each of the mediators on favorable attitudes; the c0 path is the direct moderated effect of frame on favorable attitudes after accounting for the mediated
pathways.
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